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NOTE 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE OPTIMAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE 
FIRST NATIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
BENJAMEN FRANKLEN GUSSEN 
This note extends my previous analysis of the constitutional recognition of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (‘First Nations’) by providing 
guidance on the optimal approach for this recognition. The guidance is 
founded on the concepts of efficiency and equity. An optimal recognition is 
defined as one that achieves both objectives simultaneously. Efficiency flows 
from a dynamic recognition that changes over time relatively easily, as 
exemplified by a treaty-based approach. The equity criterion has, as a proxy, 
legal pluralism, whereby constitutional recognition enlivens ‘Indigenous 
jurisprudence’ through mechanisms such as self-governance. The proposal 
is to combine efficiency and equity by guaranteeing the collective rights of 
Indigenous Australians in accordance with universally recognised principles 
and norms of international law, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (for which the Commonwealth of Australia announced its 
support in 2009). This in turn is likely to guide a treaty-based approach to 
the relationship between the Commonwealth and First Nations that can 
evolve towards legal pluralism. 
I INTRODUCTION 
This note focuses on the ideal implementation of a constitutional recognition of 
First Nations.1 The intention is to provide guidance on the best approach to such 
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1 For a detailed analysis of approaches to constitutional recognition in Canada, New Zealand, 
Bolivia and the Ecuador, see Benjamen Franklen Gussen, ‘A Comparative Analysis of 
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a constitutional recognition, assuming the existence of the required political 
volition not only to enact the same but to ensure that envisaged benefits flow 
through to the First Nations in Australia. Given the legal focus of the paper, it 
is not unreasonable to make this assumption.  
The note is structured as follows. The rest of this introduction looks at the recent 
developments in the drive for recognition, and the current proposals for 
constitutional change. The second Part introduces the analytical framework for 
choosing the optimal design. The third Part furnishes my recommendations 
based on the optimal design identified in the previous Part. These 
recommendations include the proposed wording for a new chapter in the 
Australian Constitution, and recommendations on sections 25 (provisions as to 
races disqualified from voting) and 51(xxvi) (the race power), as well as 
comments on the sections proposed by the Expert Panel on Constitutional 
Recognition of Indigenous Australians, namely sections 116A (prohibition of 
racial discrimination) and 127A (recognition of languages). The note ends, in 
Part IV, with a synopsis of the findings and some ruminations on directions for 
further research.   
A Recent Developments in the Drive for Recognition  
Part of the impetus for the current drive for a constitutional recognition of the 
First Nations in Australia came from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples Recognition Act 2013 (Cth) (‘Recognition Act’).  
The conversation began with the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of 
Indigenous Australians (‘the Expert Panel’) established in December 2009 by 
the then Prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard. Its role was to consult on the 
‘best possible options for a constitutional amendment’2 on the recognition of 
First Nations to be put to a referendum. The Expert Panel concluded in 2012 
that the recognition ‘would be incomplete without a constitutional prohibition 
of laws that discriminate on the basis of race’.3 The Expert Panel Final Report 
                                                 
Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples’ (2017) 40(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 867 (‘A Comparative Analysis’). 
2 Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians, Recognising Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Constitution: Report of the Expert Panel, January 
2012 (‘Expert Panel Final Report’) 1 <https://www.pmc.gov.au/resource-centre/indigenous-
affairs/final-report-expert-panel-recognising-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-peoples-
constitution>. 
3 Ibid 167.  
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is currently recognised as ‘the most detailed recent discussion on constitutional 
recognition’.4  
The conversation continued with the report of the Joint Select Committee on 
Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 
‘Joint Select Committee’), a Parliamentary committee established at the end of 
2013 whose role was to build a ‘secure strong multi-partisan parliamentary 
consensus’5 on the next steps towards Indigenous constitutional recognition. 
The options for constitutional reform put forward by the Joint Select Committee 
included a form of prohibition of racial discrimination. The Joint Select 
Committee had heard evidence that the prohibition ‘is considered necessary in 
order to provide substantive reform’.6  
In 2014, under the Recognition Act, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs 
appointed a Review Panel to assess ‘levels of public awareness and support for 
amending the Constitution to recognise Indigenous peoples and levels of 
community support for different proposals for constitutional change’.7 It 
reported in September the same year.8  
The most recent proposals for Indigenous constitutional recognition are set out 
in the Referendum Council’s Final Report (‘Referendum Council Final 
Report’)9 which was issued in June 2017 and to which the then Prime Minister, 
Malcolm Turnbull, responded in October 2017.10 The Referendum Council had 
been established by Mr Turnbull and the then leader of the Opposition, Bill 
                                                 
4 Referendum Council, Discussion Paper on Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Peoples, October 2016 (‘Referendum Council Discussion Paper’) 6 
<https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Referendum-Council-Discussion-
Paper-Oct2016.pdf>. 
5 Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples, Parliament of Australia, Final Report (June 2015) (‘Joint Select Committee Final 
Report’) 1 <https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2015/06/apo-nid55504-
1182366.pdf>. 
6 Ibid 63 (emphasis added). 
7 Commonwealth of Australia, Review Panel of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act, 




9 Referendum Council, Final Report of the Referendum Council, July 2017 (‘Referendum Council 
Final Report’) <https://www.referendumcouncil.org.au/sites/default/files/report_attachments/ 
Referendum_Council_Final_Report.pdf>. 
10 Malcolm Turnbull, Media Release: Response to Referendum Council’s Report on 
Constitutional Recognition (26 October 2017) <https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/ 
media/response-to-referendum-councils-report-on-constitutional-recognition>. 
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Shorten, in December 2015 to ‘[l]ead the process for national consultations and 
community engagement about constitutional recognition, including a 
concurrent series of Indigenous designed and led consultations’.11 The 
Referendum Council recognised the Joint Select Committee’s prohibition of 
racial discrimination as a ‘substantive proposal’,12 however viewed its 
protection against adverse discrimination ‘as a shield dependent upon 
interpretation by the High Court of Australia’.13 The Referendum Council’s 
Final Report compared the Joint Select Committee’s prohibition proposal to its 
own proposal that a body be established to act as an Indigenous ‘Voice to the 
Parliament’.14 While the two proposals were put forth as alternatives to each 
other,15 the Referendum Council’s Final Report stated that the Delegates to the 
First Nations Regional Dialogues preferred the ‘Voice to the Parliament’ 
option, which they viewed ‘as a sword, enabling First Peoples to advocate 
directly to the Parliament’.16 
B Proposals for Constitutional Change 
The Review Panel of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act, in its 2014 
final report, had addressed the nature of the proposition to be put to the 
Australian people in any referendum: 
Crystallising the question to be put to the Australian voters lies at the 
heart of the referendum. Indeed, shaping a final proposition is by far the most 
complex matter on the path to a referendum. Definitively assessing the 
country’s readiness for a referendum is difficult in the absence of the final 
proposal to be put to a vote.17 
The Panel had narrowed the desired constitutional amendments to three main 
elements: 
1. the placement of a statement of recognition;  
                                                 
11 Referendum Council Final Report (n 9) 3. 
12 Ibid 13. 
13 Ibid (emphasis added).  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid (emphasis added). 
17 Review Panel Final Report (n 7) 5. 
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2. the removal of section 25 ‘which currently envisages the ability of state 
governments to disqualify a group of people from voting based on 
race’; and  
3. the re-formulation of section 51(xxvi).18  
While this note addresses each one of these elements, it gives most attention to 
the first element. The analysis in this note suggests that current proposals for 
the recognition of First Nations are suboptimal as they are neither sufficiently 
wide (addressing the sui generis nature of Indigenous collective rights from 
within Indigenous jurisprudence19 nor sufficiently dynamic (allowing for 
evolutionary improvement) to meet the objectives of efficiency (in terms of the 
input needed to bring about constitutional amendments) and equality (in terms 
of affording Indigenous Australians the same development opportunities 
afforded to non-Indigenous Australians as required under international law 
standards). Instead, this note advocates a form of constitutional recognition that 
links the jurisprudence on governance structures for First Nations in Australia 
to existing international law standards, with a proviso that such recognition 
must be kept within the limits envisaged in the Australian Constitution.20  
As to the second and third elements listed above, the note recommends a 
laissez-faire approach whereby existing sections are left as they are, and 
constitutional amendment through the introduction of new sections is 
minimised. This would simplify the changes brought about by the recognition, 
and would hence improve the chances of the proposed amendments being 
passed by voters.  
The note assumes a present and continuing political will on the part of 
government to give effect to a constitutional recognition of First Nations. The 
note does not entertain the myriad of issues that would result from a 
government’s cynical approach to such recognition — if the recognition were 
simply a ‘window dressing’ exercise driven by external pressures, or if later 
governments decided to slow down progress flowing from such recognition. 
Instead the focus is on the ideal implementation of a constitutional recognition. 
The intention is to provide guidance on the best approach to constitutional 
recognition, assuming the existence of the required political will not only to 
                                                 
18 Ibid. Compare this with the type of recognition given in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Peoples Recognition Act 2013 (Cth) s 3.  
19 The term is used in this note to describe a complete legal system that, like Islam or Tikanga 
Maori, did not originate in Europe. In Australia, First Nations have such a system originating 
from their religion or mythology. 
20 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) s 9. See Part III, below. 
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enact the same, but to ensure that the envisaged benefits arising from 
implementing such a recognition flow through to First Nations. The 
implications of constitutional recognition will be considered with an eye to the 
effects that recognition may have on existing political arrangements.21  
The note is structured as follows. Part II provides the analytical framework for 
the present discussion. The analysis identifies an optimal approach to 
constitutional recognition that provides guidance in the Australian context.  
The final Part (Part III) uses the normative signals from the analytical model to 
design a proposal for a constitutional recognition of First Nations in Australia. 
The Part also provides guidance on other proposed amendments, including 
those pertaining to sections 25 and 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution.  
II THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analytical model22 depicted in Figure 1 below has two dimensions plotted 
along conventional x [horizontal] and y [vertical] axes. The first dimension on 
the x [horizontal] axis represents scope and gauges the wide versus narrow 
nature of the recognition. This dimension is a proxy for legal pluralism, with a 
narrow form of recognition promoting minimal pluralism. This narrow 
recognition eschews collective rights in favour of assimilating First Nations’ 
rights under a paradigm of individual rights. This limitation prevents any 
transition to legal pluralism, a fact which in turn is likely to weaken the 
prospects of improving the wellbeing of First Nations since it moulds their 
socio-economic development outside their own jurisprudence.23 In contrast, a 
wide recognition emphasises the collective nature of First Nations’ rights and 
enables plurinationalism (the co-existence of several different nationalities 
                                                 
21 This is done, albeit briefly, in Part II. 
22 For earlier versions of this model, refer to Benjamen Franklen Gussen, ‘A Comparative 
Analysis of Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples’ (2017) 40(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 867; Benjamen Franklen Gussen, ‘Constitutional Recognition of 
Indigenous Peoples in New Zealand and Ecuador’ in Simon Young, Jennifer Nielsen and 
Jeremy Patrick (eds), Constitutional Recognition of First Peoples in Australia: Theories and 
Comparative Perspectives (Federation Press, 2016).  
23 Rights in First Nation jurisprudence are generally collective in nature. In contrast, individual 
rights dominate Western jurisprudence. Hence, small groups, such as the family or the tribe, 
are the dominant scale in the former for assigning liability. For further clarification of this point, 
please see for example, Megan Davis, ‘Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Rights’ (2006) 5 Journal of Indigenous Policy 35 and Alexandra Xanthaki, ‘Collective Rights: 
The Case of Indigenous Peoples’ (2000) 25 Amicus Curiae 7. 
2019 CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF FIRST NATIONS IN AUSTRALIA 219 
within one polity)24 and subsidiarity (giving lower levels of social organisation, 
such as the city, church, or tribe, a constitutional space (that is, a margin of 





Figure 1: Analytical model showing two dimensions and the corresponding objectives of 
efficiency and equity. The optimal quadrant represents a union of the objectives of efficiency and 
equity. The quadrant to the bottom left is sub-optimal in that narrow and static recognition will 
reduce both efficiency and equity. 
 
                                                 
24 For a better understanding of how plurinationalism works, see Ramón Masnou Boixeda, Notes 
on Nationalism (Gracewing, 2002). See also Roger Merino, ‘Reimagining the Nation-State: 
Indigenous Peoples and the Making of Plurinationalism in Latin America’ (2018) 31(4) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 773. 
25 For more on the principle of subsidiarity, see Benjamen Gussen, Axial Shift: City Subsidiarity 
and the World System in the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).  
26 For examples of multinationalism refer to Eduardo Silva, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Movements, 
Developments, and Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia’ in Paul Almeida and Allen Cordoro Ulate 
(eds), Handbook of Social Movements across Latin America (Springer, 2015) 131. On the 
principle of subsidiarity see Benjamen F Gussen, ‘Is Subsidiarity a Conditio Sine Qua Non for 
Sustainability?’ (2015) 36(4) Policy Studies 384, and Benjamen F Gussen, ‘Subsidiarity as a 
Constitutional Principle in New Zealand’ (2014) 12(1) New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law 123.  
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The second dimension, measured on the y [vertical] axis, represents time and 
evolution.27 It gauges the dynamic versus static nature of the recognition. This 
dimension is a useful measure in cases of treaty-formation between the 
recogniser (for example the Crown) and the recognised (First Nations). A 
recognition is static when there is considerable inertia or reluctance to change, 
either due to an onerous amendment process, or to the specificity with which 
the constitution has limited the rights flowing from the recognition — for 
example through enumeration of these rights.28 On the other hand, a recognition 
is dynamic in cases where there is a variety of ways through which the 
recognition can be actioned. Hence, an approach where the recognition is with 
respect to ‘subject matter’ is more static than a recognition with reference to a 
so-called ‘persons power’.29 To be clear, section 51(xxvi) (the race power), 
section 51(xix) (the aliens power), and section 51(xx) (the corporations power) 
of the Australian Constitution are ‘persons powers’ because they require ‘the 
law to deal with things or activities which help to differentiate or identify the 
persons referred to in the power from other persons who are not referred to in 
the power’.30 It should be noted that the capacity for evolution is more important 
than the scope of the constitutional recognition. Over the long run, accumulated 
quantitative change brought about by a dynamic recognition (for example, 
through the formation of treaties between First Nations and the 
Commonwealth) is likely to lead to qualitative change that widens the 
constitutional recognition in favour of drivers of First Nations jurisprudence 
                                                 
27 Evolution in my framework means an increase in complexity, which is turn is an increase in 
scale. Scale itself is produced as a result of symmetry breaking. In this sense, evolution can be 
understood as energy dispersal or distribution (ie, entropy which is analogous to symmetry). A 
change is energy distribution signifies evolution. See Benjamen Gussen, Axial Shift: City 
Subsidiarity and the World System in the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) 177–90.  
28 See, for example, article 30(II)(14) of the Constitution of Bolivia of 2009 that recognises the 
right of First Nations ‘[t]o practice … their political, juridical and economic systems in accord 
with their world view’. See Benjamen Franklen Gussen, ‘A Comparative Analysis of 
Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples’ (2017) 40(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 867. 
29 Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples, Parliament of Australia, Interim Report (July 2014) [2.35]–[2.43] (‘Joint Select 
Committee Interim Report’), discussing subject matter powers <http://www. 
reconciliationsa.org.au/assets/media/files/Interim_report[2].pdf>; Joint Select Committee Final 
Report (n 5) [3.19]–[3.20] relating to the retention of the ‘persons power’. See also Anne 
Twomey, ‘A Revised Proposal for Indigenous Constitutional Recognition’ (2014) 36(3) Sydney 
Law Review 381. For problems with the ‘subject matter’ approach see Rosalind Dixon and 
George Williams, ‘Drafting a Replacement for the Races Power in the Australian Constitution’ 
(2014) 25 Public Law Review 85.  
30 Geoffrey Lindell, ‘The Corporations and Races Powers’ (1984) 14(3) Federal Law Review 
219, 220. 
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such as subsidiarity and thus leads to a plurinational approach to governance. 
An example of this possibility is the recognition of First Nations in Canada.31 
The optimal approach results from combining the two dimensions as shown in 
Figure 1 above. When a (second quadrant) narrow-dynamic recognition is 
opted for, there is an emphasis on efficiency. The focus is on reducing the costs 
flowing from constitutional recognition by keeping the input requirements for 
the recognition, such as the cost of treaty-negotiations that could lead to 
subsidiarity and plurinationalism, to a minimum. This economy is usually 
achieved by ignoring legal pluralism and recognising only individual rights. 
This deficiency in designing the recognition leads to lower welfare expectations 
initially, relative to the first quadrant approach, although these expectations can 
progress gradually over time.32 In contrast, a (fourth-quadrant) wide-static 
recognition emphasises equality and the benefits that derive from the 
recognition. A wide recognition can afford First Nations legal pluralism, but 
the cost could be prohibitive. Therefore, a cap in the form of a static recognition 
is imposed by weakening possibilities for progress to non-enumerated rights, 
and a strategy of subsidiarity (in the form of transferring more competencies 
and discretion to First Nations) is adopted. The responsibility for meeting the 
costs of a wider recognition is delegated to First Nations.  
III RECOMMENDATIONS 
My proposed approach to constitutional recognition in Australia is to combine 
the efficiency (treaty-based approach) as seen, for example, in Canada and New 
Zealand with the equity (legal pluralism approach) as seen, for example, in 
Ecuador and Bolivia.33 While it is not always possible to achieve efficiency and 
equity simultaneously (as the one is focused on inputs and the other on outputs), 
it is possible in the present case to combine the two in a ‘staggered’ fashion 
where both efficiency and equity occur, but not at the same time. The proposal 
is for a recognition that guarantees the collective rights of First Nations in 
accordance with universally recognised principles and norms of international 
                                                 
31 For a detailed analysis of the approach in Canada, see Benjamen Franklen Gussen, ‘A 
Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples’ (2017) 40(3) 
Melbourne University Law Review 867. This evolutionary approach contemplates processes 
such as treaty re-interpretation by the courts (NZ), or treaty renegotiation (replacing the treaty 
in its entirety). Both processes are evolutionary in their time scale — taking centuries. The 
envisaged evolution does not assume that the treaty is open to being better informed, open to 
revision/amendment/sunsetting, or that revision procedures are part of the treaty, and so forth.   
32 As seen in Canada. 
33 A full analysis of the constitutional recognition of First Nations in these four jurisdictions is 
provided in Gussen, ‘A Comparative Analysis’ (n 1). 
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law, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples34 (for 
which the Commonwealth of Australia announced its support in 2009).35 This 
in turn is likely to see the relationship between the Commonwealth and First 
Nations evolve towards a treaty-based approach similar to that of New Zealand 
and Canada. What is envisaged is a series of treaties between the Indigenous 
communities and the Commonwealth.  
To be able to combine efficiency and equity, the recognition would have to 
refer to legal standards outside the Australian Constitution, such as standards 
embodied in treaties that envisage legal pluralism, for example through self-
determination. The proposal is for treaties between the Crown (in right of the 
Commonwealth) and First Nations that recognise (hard and soft) international 
law instruments in relation to First Nations and other minorities. These 
instruments include: the United Nations Charter (which requires fundamental 
freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion);36 the 
1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities;37 the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People;38 the International Labour Organization Convention on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Convention No 169);39 the UN Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;40 the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief;41 the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity;42 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;43 and the International Convention on 
                                                 
34 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007).  
35 Michael Dodson, ‘Australian Government Announcement on the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples’ (Government Announcement, 3 April 2009) <https://ncis. 
anu.edu.au/_lib/doc/MD_statement_Aust_Govt_endorsement_Dec_RIPs_19-30apr10.pdf>. 
36 Charter of the United Nations art 1(3).  
37 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, GA Res 47/135 (18 December 1992).  
38 Above n 34.  
39 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, opened for 
signature 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383 (entered into force 5 September 1990).  
40 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened 
for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969). 
41 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief, GA Res 36/55, UN GAOR, 36th Sess, Supp No 51, UN Doc A/36/684 (1981) 
171.  
42 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, General Conference of UNESCO, 31st Sess (2 
November 2001) art 4. 
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 27. 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.44 Since the 1960s the international law 
paradigm has shifted from one of assimilation to one of diversity. This can be 
seen by comparing the International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous 
and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No 107 of 1957)45 with its revised 
version, the abovementioned Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
(No 169 of 1989).46 The Preamble to the 1989 Convention stresses control by 
First Nations of their own institutions, while the Preamble to the 1957 
Convention used the language of ‘protection and integration of indigenous 
[peoples]’ and was based on the assumption that Indigenous peoples would 
disappear with modernisation.47 The current international human rights regime 
instead advances a ‘plurinational’ model.48  
Inspiration from international law on First Nations is already a factor pressing 
towards constitutional evolution in Australia, not only through the High Court 
interpretation of the Commonwealth Constitution, but also, and as effectively, 
through the political pressure on Australia to take its rightful place as a world 
leader. Submissions to the Joint Select Committee49 have already referred the 
Committee to the recognition of Indigenous peoples in international law, in 
particular in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.50 Moreover, in its 1992 Mabo v Queensland decision,51 the High Court 
                                                 
44 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
45 Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, adopted 26 June 1957, 328 UNTS 248 
(entered into force 2 June 1959) (‘Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations’). 
46 Above n 39. 
47 Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations (n 45) Preamble.  
48 See Jost Delbrück ‘Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order: 
International Law in the Era of Globalization’ (2001) 11 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für 
internationales und europäisches Recht 1; Francisco Lopez Bermudez, ‘Indigenous Peoples 
and International Law: The Case of Ecuador’ (1997) 10(1) St Thomas Law Review 175; Stephen 
Tierney, ‘Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges 
to the Nation-State’ (2005) 54(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 161. 
49 For example, Law Council of Australia, Submission No 288 to the Joint Select Committee on 
Constitutional Recognition relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, 
Constitutional Recognition Relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (15 June 
2018). Submissions can be found at ‘Submissions Received by the Committee’, Parliament of 
Australia (Web Page) <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/ 
Former_Committees/Constitutional_Recognition_2018/ConstRecognition/Submissions>.  
50 The proposed constitutional recognition follows Australia’s adoption in 2009 of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (n 34).  
51 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.  
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relied on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
prohibition of unjust discrimination.52 There are many other instances where 
Australian constitutional law has developed in unison with international law 
instruments (and not only in relation to First Nations) largely through the 
application of the section 51(xxix) ‘external affairs’ power.53 Mabo suggests 
the emergence of a school of constitutional interpretation that converges 
towards the general principles of customary international law, to the extent 
possible, without conflict with legislation or common law.  
The treaties that I propose between the First Nations and the Commonwealth 
could be viewed, from the perspective of legal pluralism, as treaties between 
sovereigns or different nations and hence as international treaties.54 These 
treaties would then form part of Australia’s fulfilment of its current obligations 
under international law, for example under the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples of 2007. This treaty-based framework would lead to a 
larger role for customary international law in First Nations jurisprudence in 
Australia. In particular, this framework would lead to customary international 
law being argued in Australian courts as part of the interpretation of the treaties. 
My proposal is hence for First Nations governance structures to be established 
in Australia, guided by customary international law as embodied in 
international law instruments.55 Most of these instruments are based on binding 
treaties, although some represent ‘soft law’ instruments.56  
                                                 
52 In particular the judgment by Brennan J: Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42. 
Mason CJ and McHugh J also endorsed harmonising the development of Australian domestic 
law with the instruments of international law: at 15.  
53 See, for example, Commonwealth v State of Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Franklin Dam 
case’) and Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261 (‘Lemonthyme case’). See 
also the UN Human Rights Committee decision in Toonen v Australia, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) for the effect of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights on domestic law. For a general discussion of this nexus between international 
and domestic law, see Hilary Charlesworth et al (eds), The Fluid State: International Law and 
National Legal Systems (Federation Press, 2005).  
54 See for example Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, Final Report on the Study of 
Treaties, Agreements and other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous 
Populations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20 (22 June 1999).  
55 See Garth Nettheim, Gary D Meyers and Donna Craig, Indigenous Peoples and Governance 
Structures: A Comparative Analysis of Land and Resource Management Rights (Aboriginal 
Studies Press, 2002). 
56 These include most resolutions and declarations of the UN General Assembly, for example, 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (n 34). See, however, 
Megan Davis, ‘To Bind or Not to Bind: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Five Years On’ (2012) 19 Australian International Law Journal 17. 
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The following Part provides an example of the possible wording of a 
constitutional recognition, providing a platform for future treaty negotiation.  
A Form of Constitutional Wording 
This note proposes that a new chapter be added to the Australian Constitution. 
Given that the proposed constitutional recognition is intended to bestow honour 
and remembrance on the Aboriginal Peoples of Australia, it would be best to 
introduce a new, dedicated chapter (Chapter IIIA) into the Constitution for the 
purpose of this recognition. This approach is in line with one of the options 
identified by the Joint Select Committee.57 
The first section of the proposed chapter would serve to remember the role 
played by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in Australia’s past, 
while their present role would be acknowledged in a second section that would 
emphasise the sui generis nature of their cultures. The future of the relationship 
between the Commonwealth and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples would be recognised in a third section which would refer to 
international law standards. leading to a treaty-based framework that would 
increase the political, social, and economic autonomy of Australia’s First 
Nations. Giving effect to the section 80C obligations below would form the 
backbone of the relationship between the Commonwealth and First Nations, a 
relationship that would later be fleshed out through negotiating separate treaties 
for each nation. 
The proposed wording of the new chapter is as follows:  
Chapter IIIA Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Peoples  
 
80A The Commonwealth of Australia recognises the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Peoples as the first occupiers of the 
Australian continent.  
80B The Commonwealth of Australia acknowledges the perennial 
and sui generis nature of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
cultures, and the continuing relationship of these cultures to 
their traditional territories.  
                                                 
57 Joint Select Committee Interim Report (n 29) [2.33]; Joint Select Committee Final Report (n 
5) [4.14].   
226 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 24 
80C The Commonwealth of Australia, subject to this Constitution, 
shall guarantee the collective rights of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Peoples according to the universally recognised 
principles and norms of customary international law and 
international treaties and agreements of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
The difference between my proposed chapter and current proposals made by 
the Joint Select Committee58 lies mainly in the third section, section 80C. The 
Committee proposals seem to derive their language from the Canadian 
Constitution Act, 1867, in particular section 91(24).59 The same language is 
found in section 51(xxvi) of the current Australian Constitution. It is submitted 
that the approach taken in section 91(24) is outdated. The 148 years that have 
followed the enactment of this subsection have seen great strides in 
international law on the governance of First Nations. Today, reference to 
international law instruments, as proposed in section 80C above, would be more 
in line with modern jurisprudence on the subject matter. Similar language to 
that of section 80C can already be seen in the Constitution of Ecuador,60 and in 
the Constitution of Bolivia.61 Further examples can be found in other 
constitutions, for example the Constitution of Russia of 1993,62 and the 
Constitution of South Korea.63  
                                                 
58 Joint Select Committee Final Report (n 5) [4.88] Recommendation 5. See also Nicky Jones, 
‘Reforming the Australian Constitution: An Overview of Recognition Proposals’ in Simon 
Young, Jennifer Nielson, and Jeremy Patrick, Constitutional Recognition of First Peoples in 
Australia: Theories and Comparative Perspectives (Federation Press, 2016) 48.  
59 Constitution Act 1867 (Imp) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91: ‘… it is hereby declared that 
(notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of 
Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter 
enumerated; that is to say, … 24. Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.’ 
60 For example, Constitution of Ecuador of 2008, art 3: ‘The State’s prime duties are: 1. 
Guaranteeing without any discrimination whatsoever the true possession of the rights set forth 
in the Constitution and in international instruments, especially the rights to education, health, 
food, social security and water for its inhabitants.’ 
61 For example, Constitution of Bolivia of 2009, art 14(III): ‘The State guarantees all people and 
communities, without discrimination, the free and effective exercise of the rights established in 
this Constitution, laws and international treaties of human rights.’  
62 Constitution of Russia of 1993, art 69: ‘The Russian Federation shall guarantee the rights of 
the indigenous small peoples according to the universally recognized principles and norms of 
international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation.’ 
63 Constitution of South Korea 1948, art 6(1): ‘Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under 
the Constitution and the generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same 
effect as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea.’ 
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B Recommendations on Section 25 and Section 
51(xxvi) 
Current proposals by the Joint Select Committee on the constitutional 
recognition of First Nations also recommend the repeal of section 25 of the 
current Australian Constitution.64 My recommendation, on the other hand, is 
not to repeal this section. As noted by a number of commentators,65 this section 
is inspired by the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is 
intended as a penalty imposed on States that deny the vote to First Nations.66 
Reference to race in this section cannot be interpreted in a negative manner. As 
to reference to race generally, this can be seen in many constitutions, including 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.67 The objective of removing 
reference to ‘race’ from the Australian Constitution might have great symbolic 
value, but no more. On the other hand, shifting the focus to section 25, by 
repealing it, could detract from the essential issue of introducing a wide and 
dynamic constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians. Moreover, the 
recommended Chapter IIIA, as worded above, would provide added guarantees 
(from international law treaties already endorsed by Australia) that section 25 
would not be invoked in a way detrimental to Indigenous Australians.  
Similar arguments militate against repealing section 51(xxvi). While the High 
Court decision in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth68 suggests that section 51(xxvi) 
could be used to enact laws that discriminate against Aboriginal peoples, in 
practical terms this is highly unlikely. This is because, in a globalising world, 
the Australian approach to First Nations is likely to become more in tune with 
the international approach. Discrimination would be seen as very costly for 
Australia’s role on the international stage. Again, the constitutional recognition 
suggested in this note, and especially that contained in proposed section 80C, 
would ensure that the current section 51(xxvi) is not used to discriminate 
                                                 
64 Joint Select Committee Final Report (n 5) [3.19] Recommendation 3.   
65 See Anne Twomey, ‘An Obituary for Section 25 of the Constitution’ (2012) 23(2) Public Law 
Review 125. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’) s 15(1) 
‘Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based 
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. (2) 
Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.’ 
68 (1998) 195 CLR 337 (‘Hindmarsh Island Bridge case’). 
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against Indigenous Australians; the proposed section enshrines in the 
Constitution the international law guarantees already endorsed by Australia.  
In fact, the combination of the proposed section 80C and the current section 
51(xxvi) would be the ideal basis for the formation of treaties with Australia’s 
First Nations. Section 80C would inform the content of such treaties, while the 
exclusive power of the Commonwealth under section 51(xxvi) would create 
efficiency gains produced by a homogeneous approach across all Australian 
states and territories.  
Furthermore, as found by the Expert Panel and the Joint Select Committee, a 
repeal of section 51(xxvi) would need to be accompanied by new 
Commonwealth legislation to remove the risk of invalidating other legislation 
relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.69 Given the low risks 
posed by leaving this subsection as it is, there is little justification for its repeal. 
Its reformulation is equally problematic. Proposals for a reformulation of 
section 51(xxvi) risk being seen by voters as a ‘special treatment’ of First 
Nations.70  
C Expert Panel’s Proposed New Section 116A and 
Section 127A 
As to the introduction of sections 116A and 127A,71 the recognition approach 
proposed in this note makes these sections redundant. Given the formulation 
presented in proposed section 80C, namely the invocation of international law 
instruments (already endorsed by Australia) that prohibit discrimination (for 
example, article 2 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
                                                 
69 Joint Select Committee Interim Report (n 29) [2.26]–[2.29]. But cf Joint Select Committee 
Final Report (n 5) ch 3. 
70 Joint Select Committee Interim Report (n 29) [2.18]–[2.27]; Joint Select Committee Final 
Report (n 5) ch 3. 
71 The draft text of these sections is as follows: 
‘Section 116A Prohibition of racial discrimination 
(1) The Commonwealth, a State or a Territory shall not discriminate on the grounds of race, 
colour or ethnic or national origin.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude the making of laws or measures for the purpose of 
overcoming disadvantage, ameliorating the effects of past discrimination, or protecting the 
cultures, languages or heritage of any group.’ 
‘Section 127A Recognition of languages 
(1) The national language of the Commonwealth of Australia is English.  
(2) The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages are the original Australian languages, 
a part of our national heritage.’ 
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Racial Discrimination; and article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights), and that ensure the recognition of Indigenous languages (for example 
article 13 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), it should 
be clear that re-inventing the wheel through sections such as 116A and 127A 
would be not only a narrow approach, but one that is highly inefficient. 
IV CONCLUSION 
This note advocates for a constitutional recognition of Australia’s First Nations 
consistent with the objectives of efficiency and equality. In this sense, it 
presents an ideal-type model for recognition. The analytical approach uses 
stylised constitutional recognition along two dimensions: dynamic (-static) 
recognition and wide (-narrow) recognition. The first dimension reflects the 
evolution of First Nations’ wellbeing through continuous improvement in their 
affairs, unhindered by the inertia of constitutional amendment processes or by 
ossified constitutional lists of enumerated rights. The second dimension is a 
proxy for legal pluralism and concerns the nature of the rights flowing from any 
recognition, and whether the rights are assimilated under Western jurisprudence 
or accepted as sui generis in nature.  
An optimal recognition is one that is efficient and equitable. To achieve a 
dynamic recognition, the actual rights should not be enumerated in the 
Constitution, but left for legislative intervention based on the Constitution, as 
well as further development through the courts. This would be consistent with 
Mabo, which is about the emergence of a school of constitutional interpretation. 
To secure a wide recognition, a ‘plurinational’ approach would be needed, 
inspired by international law instruments such as the ILO Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 198972 and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.73 To achieve this optimal design, recognition 
would need to be guaranteed by universal international law principles in 
relation to First Nations, and minorities generally.  
Here it is important to remind ourselves of an explicit assumption made earlier, 
namely that the government has the political will to give effect to this 
recognition. This political will was presented as an essential precondition to the 
desired outcome. It would be of interest to see now what would happen if we 
relax this assumption. It is no secret that the Commonwealth has done very little 
in the way of respecting its commitments to the United Nations. The treatment 
                                                 
72 See above n 39.  
73 See above n 38.  
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of asylum seekers is a case in point.74 In fact, given the merely symbolic sub-
national recognition of First Nations in state constitutions, it is difficult to 
imagine the Commonwealth respecting its commitment to take international 
norms and principles into account in its dealings with Indigenous Australians. 
Put simply, there is not enough political pressure from First Nations to alter the 
position of the States, and hence to put pressure on the Commonwealth, even 
to the extent seen in Canada in which the demographic and geographic profiles 
of First Nations are similar to those in Australia.75  
However, probably the best means by which First Nations could bring about a 
dynamic and wide recognition of their rights is not political, but economic. 
Socio-economic benefits may accrue from an ‘optimal’ recognition as 
discussed above. The Commonwealth should extrapolate lessons learned in 
other jurisdictions, most notably in New Zealand and the Māori contribution to 
the economy of that country (triggered through Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements).76  
It would be useful to see the analytical model enhanced by application to a 
larger sample of countries, and potentially with time-series data that tracks the 
wellbeing of First Nations before and after their constitutional recognition. The 
question is whether constitutional recognition has an identifiable causal link 
with improvement in the well-being of Indigenous peoples. In other words, are 
First Nations better off where there is recognition? It will be necessary to 
develop a composite measure capable of capturing wellbeing, for example 
through an assessment of the economic contribution by First Nations to the 
national GDP, although such measures only poorly assess wellbeing. There 
might also be a need to bolster the model with more analytical dimensions that 
capture further nuances in constitutional recognition between different 
jurisdictions. A centralised national Australian monitor of these variables 
would be critical to conducting a ‘health check’ on the effects of any 
recognition that finally materialises, and how the same can be optimised.  
                                                 
74 In particular, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has found Australia’s policies on asylum 
seekers to be in violation of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment which Australia signed in 2009 but did not ratify. See 
‘UN Finds Australia’s Treatment of Asylum Seekers Violates the Convention against Torture’, 
Human Rights Law Centre (News Report, 6 March 2015) <https://www.hrlc.org.au/news/un-
finds-australias-treatment-of-asylum-seekers-violates-the-convention-against-torture>. 
75 Canada and New Zealand are discussed in detail in Gussen (n 1). 
76 See Ganesh Nana, Fiona Stokes and Wilma Molano, The Māori Economy, Science and 
Innovation: Potential Opportunity and Value (Business and Economic Research, Ltd, 2011). 
